By Lt Col (Dr) Anupam Tiwari

Drones’ incorporation into contemporary militaries is now inevitable, not just due to their speed and accuracy but also due to their capacity to offer real-time observation and expedite the extraction of intelligence, which aids in more knowledgeable decision-making. As much as there are several initiatives aimed at nurturing the development of the drone business and promoting collaboration, there are some vital factors that should be identified in the ecosystem since failure to do so may hinder investments, efforts and foreseen vision for the nation. The perils of reliance and trust on outsourced technology became evident during the Kargil War when access to GPS was limited by the US, forcing Indian forces to rely on traditional methods like compasses and star-based navigation. This article brings out certain other verticals peculiar to drone ecosystem vulnerabilities which are usually in the hindsight of discussions and lack tight timelines for the 2047 Viksit Aatmnirbhar Bharat mission. These have been discussed under the following heads:
- Foundations
- Hardware
- Software
- Strategic
- National Missions

Foundations
- Cryptography: India does not have widely deployed and known indigenous public cryptographic algorithms, and in the drone ecosystem, the country mainly relies on global standards, particularly those provided by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), USA. In a significant development, NIST unveiled its Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) Standards on August 13, 2024. These standards are designed to be future-proof in the pre-vision of the emergence of Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computers (CRQCs), which have the potential to break the classical cryptographic systems that have been trusted and been in use for over a few decades now.
- While typically upgrade of an API/software or OS deems an upgrade/change of software and sometimes affects into hardware changes also, the stratagem of migration to PQC per se drones is complex. This roadmap just does not only affect software changes but also complex last-mile hardware and communication protocol modifications. This complexity is primarily attributed to the larger key sizes in PQC standards, which can range from approximately 1,500 to 2,592 bytes, compared to the current key sizes of 256 or 512 bits used in classical cryptographic systems like RSA and ECC.
- Post-Quantum Drones: The world of drones is preparing for post-quantum transitions, yet India stands uncertain about what the future holds for drone security and migration strategies in the context of post-quantum and future readiness.
- Time Synchronization and Clocks: Drones depend largely on accurate time synchronization by using protocols such as NTP (Network Time Protocol) and PTP (Precision Time Protocol) to navigate and function accurately. India does not yet have a truly indigenous atomic clock network, however, instead depends on foreign-supplied atomic clocks and GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System) signals for time reference in drones. This dependence leaves us susceptible to outages, especially during high-stakes operations where exact timing is crucial. U.S. GPS, for example, uses extremely stable Cesium-133 atomic clocks for long-term accuracy and Rubidium clocks for short-term preciseness.
- GNSS Dependency: India’s own NAVIC (Navigation with Indian Constellation) system for regional satellite-based positioning services is already up in the sky with 11 satellites. Currently, only four satellites are engaged in offering PNT services while the other non-operational satellites for PNT services have been reassigned to provide other services, like safety-of-life messaging. Other than these four, the rest of NAVIC satellites are plagued by operational failures due mainly to ex-import atomic clock problems. In addition, even the latest satellite launch in February 2025 endured an engine failure, yet again highlighting the vulnerability of the present infrastructure.
- These technical failures, while acutely distressing in the immediate term, should serve as triggers for improvement in future attempts. All these setbacks must be viewed as part of the journey toward eventual success. Whenever a failure occurs, instead of creating distressing or disrespectful noise, it should be seen as just another step on the path to success, not the end of the mission. That’s the true building of a developed nation which is just not loads of success always but a mixed bag of failures, attempts and eventual success. But until this is resolved, we are beholden to foreign GNSS systems such as US GPS. Such dependence puts us at the mercy of the risks that, in the case of increased conflict or in times of crucial combat, Indian drones will be grounded or cannot efficaciously function, even being limited in drone airports by no secure and reliable navigation.
Hardware
- Chips and Processors: Currently, the majority of chips and processors in drones are fabricated with sizes of 35 nm or larger, whereas FPV drones run on sizes from 7 nm to 15 nm. This leads us to an important question: Will India’s vision come to realize the 7-15 nm range by 2047? It feels like a retarded dream, particularly when the world is evolving with new-generation technologies beyond conventional chips such as 3D chips, neuromorphic computing, quantum computing, spintronics, carbon nanotubes, and molecular computing etc.
- With all these global developments, one begins to wonder: Does India have a vision ahead of generic semiconductor chip manufacturing? The National Chip Mission is set up to manufacture 28 nm chips by 2026 in collaboration with international partners and seems to be just trying to catch up – this raises a larger issue of creating long-term dependency on foreign partnerships. Are these collaborations short-term fixes, or building long-term dependencies?
- Battery dependence: Energy storage in drones is majorly dependent on batteries, and the most forward-looking battery technologies like high-energy-density lithium-ion or lithium-polymer cells are non-domestic. This foreign dependence on supplies introduces vulnerabilities in the supply chain and limits the ability to control performance optimization catering to local requirements. The absence of indigenous manufacturing capabilities for advanced battery management systems and tailored battery chemistries also impedes innovation and scalability.

Softwares
- Hardware Trojans: Although the imported hardware performs adequately per se function, it is highly risky because of potentially concealed Hardware Trojans. Unlike software Trojans, these Trojans may lay hidden in ICs for a long time before being triggered by an adversary, hence their difficulty in being detected. Our inability to audit and verify such components subjects us to major vulnerabilities. There are ways and means today to detect Hardware Trojans but that requires 100 percent checks, which is inconceivable at the scale of millions of chips and processors. This can only be assured if on-premise truly indigenous lithographic machines and trusted semiconductor foundries are available.
- The same applies to storage and the data center’s infrastructure. Most cloud solutions, as well as all storage hardware, are foreign-based, leaving us vulnerable to embedded Hardware Trojans and side-channel attacks, which exploit leaks like power consumption or electromagnetic radiation to extract sensitive data.
- Drone OS: Drone control is dependent on drone operating systems (OS), but India does not have a strong indigenous representation. Some of the salient international drone OS include PX4, ArduPilot, RTOS, QNX, FreeRTOS, VxWorks, DJI Naza, and Auterion to mention a few. India has no major domestic drone OS and depends importantly on foreign platforms. The available ‘indigenous’ ones are largely derivatives of open-source solutions such as PX4 or ArduPilot with little customization and thus are not suited for local requirements per se hardened security control. India’s reliance on foreign OS also raises vulnerability in sensitive areas such as defence and surveillance.
- Communication Protocol: Drone systems again largely rely on foreign communication protocols, like Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, or proprietary RF standards. This dependency restricts security, performance, and scalability control, exposing drones to malicious manipulation or interference. Foreign protocols can be backdoored or insufficient to meet local standing regulations. Unless indigenous security and optimized protocols are developed for secure communication, drones will encounter issues of data integrity, latency, and antijam electronic warfare. Other nations such as Russia and China have made developments in protocols specifically to secure security and cut out foreign dependence to keep their systems better under control.
Strategic
- Rare Earths Dependency: The growing use of drones, particularly in military activities such as the Ukraine-Russia war, has brought to the forefront a very serious weakness in their supply chain: reliance on rare earth materials. Essential components like Neodymium for motors, Lithium, Cobalt, and Nickel for batteries, and Tantalum, Palladium, Dysprosium, and Terbium for electronics are critical to drone technology. Yet most of these resources are found in politically unstable areas, posing a serious national security threat and impending dependence.
- To retort this risk, there is a need for a domestic supply chain for rare earth materials. While this might seem easy to type here, the actual difficulty is in how we can do this and be a major part of the global, usually competitive, supply chain. Investing in alternative supplies, recycling, and the production of substitute material can minimize dependence, guarantee national resilience, and enable further evolution of drone technology for both defence and civilian purposes.
National Missions
- National Blockchain for Transparency: The National Blockchain Mission, initiated in 2020, is a far cry from its complete adoption. Although numerous states have deployed commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) blockchain solutions, these are standalone solutions and non-interoperable, leading to an isolated system. What one desperately needs at the moment is an integrated National Blockchain Infrastructure (NBI) that provides visibility and can also address key verticals such as drone logistics and supply chain, among others. This NBI will need to be available at a national level, allowing for effortless adoption by all states.
- AI and Data Security: As AI adoption accelerates across industries, India must be cautious not to fall prey to the dangers associated with adopting pre-trained AI models without due diligence. These models often exhibit weaknesses, including biased and poisoned training datasets, as well as malicious prompts planted by potentially harmful state actors. In the context of drones, such vulnerabilities could lead to serious consequences, such as data exposure and system compromise. To mitigate these risks, India should prioritize the development of indigenous AI models aligned with the National AI mission and assume robust benchmarking standards (only indigenous) that ensure the security, integrity, explainability and reliability of AI systems within the drone technology ecosystem. Techniques like differential privacy, privacy budget, synthetic data etc can impart solid foundations to the emerging drone ecosystem per se AI readiness.
In today’s context, we certainly risk falling into an infocalypse—blaming each other, creating noise, and not taking action. India’s vision for 2047 must be seen as a continuous, 24×7 effort. If we don’t act with urgency, we may just swap two digits to 2074 in times ahead, still dreaming of the same goals without attaining them. To truly lead, we must move beyond vision and work unrelentingly to build resiliency in every aspect of drone technology and supply chain indigenization. All the key verticals mentioned above in this brief cannot be achieved in the short term; rather, they represent a continuous process of evolution. It will take decades before we begin to see the shape of a ‘Viksit Bharat’ undoubtedly realizable only through a holistic and whole-of-nation approach.
Dr Anupam Tiwari, a Ph.D in Blockchain Technology, is Advisor (Cyber) in the office of the Principal Advisor, Ministry of Defence, New Delhi.